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Abstract 
China started to develop its offshore oil resources in earnest in the early 1980s, when world oil price
was high and projections about the potential of its offshore oil were extremely rosy. But as exploration
and development efforts unfolded in the 1980s, disillusionment set in very quickly, given the mediocre
amount of oil discoveries made. This article traces the development of the Chinese offshore oil industry
from the early 1980s to 1998, with emphasis on the last ten years. Various aspects of development,
including length of seismic survey lines undertaken, number of wells drilled, amount of oil discovered,
amount of investments made, offshore fields developed, offshore production and revenue from oil sales
are presented and analysed.
Further, the article also discusses in detail the factors that contributed to the deflation of the high
hopes relating to Chinese offshore production, with a final section taking a glimpse into the future.
Oil, after coal, is the second most important energy source in China; with a consumption of 188 mil-
lion tonnes of oil equivalent (toe), it accounted for 19.8% of total energy consumption in 1998. China
used to be an important oil exporter in the 1980s, exporting 34 million tonnes of hydrocarbons (crude
and oil products) at its zenith in 1986. For some years, oil exports accounted for 1/5 to 1/4 of total
export receipts then (Chow, 1990, 1992; Kaempfer and Min, Jr, 1985). The country has become a net oil
importer since 1993, with net hydrocarbon imports amounting to 29 million tonnes in 1998.
It is clear that some drastic changes occurred to the Chinese oil balance: Oil production started to
stagnate in 1989, with actual output declining from 137 million tonnes in 1988 to 124 million tonnes in
1998 (Table 1). In the first half of the 1980s, the Chinese realized that their eastern onshore fields, the
major producing fields, were maturing, signifying that it would be very difficult to raise oil production
in the future without tapping new fields in other regions (Chow, 1991; Lang, 1997, p. 36). Consequen-
tly, they decided to concentrate efforts on developing their offshore oil resources on the one hand, and
made concerted efforts to explore for and develop the oil resources in the interior western basins on the
other. These two other sources were slated to be the back up producers of oil in the 1990s and beyond.
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This article takes a synoptic view of Chinese offshore development since the 1980s to the present,
with emphasis on the major developments in the last decade, i.e. 1987-1998. We will analyse the
amount of exploration and development work undertaken, investments made, the arrangements with the
foreign oil firms by which joint development was made, the discoveries and actual oil production, and
the factors contributing to the deflation of high hopes to the modest levels of actual production. The
drawing out of such a “big picture” might be of use to energy specialists and policy makers.
Offshore Development Before the Mid-1980s
China possesses 18,000 km of coastline and a continental shelf of 1.3 million sq km. Offshore oil
exploration started in earnest in the 1970s. With the adoption of the open door policy in 1978 and the
onset of the second oil crisis in 1980, the country decided to step up its efforts in offshore exploration by
inviting multinational oil firms to participate in joint development. The most commonly used form of
joint development, i.e. production sharing, was adopted, in which the foreign oil company was responsi-
ble for all the expenses of geophysical prospecting and exploration up to the stage at which a field was
deemed to be commercially worthy of exploitation. Development costs were borne by the host country
and the foreign firm. After the oil -field comes on stream, the foreign firm has the privilege of recouping
its exploration outlay first, then the oil is divided between the two parties according to proportions
agreed to in the original contract.
In the Chinese context, 51% of the development costs was borne by China. The oil produced is divid-
ed into three parts: 1. “cost oil” for covering production costs and repaying exploration expenses; 2. “tax
oil” for paying mining royalty of 12.5% and industrial-commercial tax of 5%; 3. “profit oil” to be divid-
ed according to the contract, but the foreign firm has to pay a profit tax of 50% on the profits it makes
(Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Zhengce Zhinan, 1993, p. 850).
Table 1. Role of Oil in Chinese Energy
- Denotes net imports
Sources: Oil Production, Energy Consumption and Oil Share: State Statistical Bureau,Statistical Yearbook of China 1999, various
pages
Sources: Oil Exports and Oil Imports: Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade, various issues and pages
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Oil Share
(%)
Energy Consumption
(Million mtce)
Oil Balance
(Million tonnes)
Oil Imports
(Million tonnes)
Oil Exports
(Million tonnes)
Oil Production
(Million tonnes)Year
17.0866.3231.132.8233.95134.141987
17.0929.9727.784.4232.20137.051988
17.1969.3421.449.2730.71137.651989
16.6987.0323.736.5730.30138.311990
17.11 037.8319.4810.8930.37140.991991
17.51 091.70 6.4419.9926.43142.041992
18.21 159.93-8.5732.9624.39145.241993
17.41 227.37-1.3125.2423.93146.081994
17.51 311.76-8.9031.4822.58150.041995
18.01 389.48-13.9538.4524.50157.331996
18.61 420.00-33.8459.2625.42160.431997
19.81 360.00-29.149.0619.96123.651998
In the early 1980s, many rosy estimates of Chinese offshore oil potential were made, with the area
hailed as the last great frontier for oil exploration. Talks of a second Saudi Arabia or North Sea abound-
ed. The Chinese maintained that offshore oil reserves could amount to 75 million barrels; and more opti-
mistic forecasts put potential 1990 production at 2 million barrels/day (b/d).
From north to south, the Bohai, the Yellow sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the
Beibuwan and the Yinggehai are all potential oil bearing areas (Fig. 1). The first round of international
bidding was launched in Feb. 1982, opening up 150,000 sq km in the Pear River Mouth (part of the
South China Sea), south Beibuwan, west Yinggehai and south Yellow Sea for exploration. Activities
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Fig 1 The Six Offshore Basins of China
arising out of this round included 118,000 km of seismic survey lines and 83 wells being drilled, leading
to the discovery of the Xijiang 24-3, Huizhou 21-1, Huizhou 33-1, Wenchang 19-1, and Lufeng 22-1
oil-and-gas bearing structures. This first round resulted in the signing of 19 contracts with 28 companies
coming from 9 countries (Table 2).
A second round of bidding was launched in Nov 1984, opening up 108,000 sq km in the east
Yinggehai, the Pearl River Mouth and the south Yellow Sea for exploration. Subsequent discoveries
included the Lufeng 13-1 and Liuhua 11-1 oil-and-gas bearing structures. This round attracted 15 firms
from 5 countries signing 12 contracts with China.
Total foreign investment under the two rounds amounted to U.S.$600 million. 190 wells were drilled
in the Bohai and the South China Sea, 55 of which discovered oil/gas, giving a success rate of 30% (for
general discussion of Chinese oil industry before the mid-1980s, see Dangdai Zhongguo de Shiyou
Gongye, 1988; Woodard, 1981; Kambara, 1984; World Bank, 1983, 1985; Fridley, 1990). In Oct. 1985,
the Chengbei field in Bohai, a joint project with a Japanese partner, came on stream, marking the com-
mencement of commercial offshore production.
Offshore Development in the Past Decade
During 1987-98, the length of seismic survey lines carried out amounted to 1.044 million km (Table
3). Total number of exploratory wells sunk was 377; 224 being drilled by the Chinese alone, and 153
drilled by joint ventures. It is noteworthy that in both cases the Chinese efforts surpassed those of the
joint ventures. 88 oil-and-gas bearing structures, covering 12,000 sq km, were discovered during this
period.
Since 1987, the length of seismic survey lines per year done by the Chinese has persistently surpassed
that of the joint ventures. On average, China drilled 15-20 exploratory and appraisal wells per year, the
number being kept fairly stable from one year to the next. The government provided various incentives
to encourage offshore exploration, e.g. since 1986 imports needed for oil development have been duty
free; in 1987, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has been given exclusive control
over the exploration, development, production and marketing of offshore oil, with the state allocating
100 million renminbi to offshore oil as capital per year. CNOOC could also borrow from domestic or
international sources and was free to earn foreign exchange (Luo, 1989).
The number of oil-and-gas bearing structures discovered is closely related to the length of seismic
survey lines carried out and the number of wells drilled (Table 3). The data revealed that more oil-and-
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Contractual ConditionsBlocsArea(000 km2)Area Opened UpDateRound
ContractsCompaniesCountries
1928943150Peal River Mouth, S. Beibuwan, W Yinggehai and S. 
Yellow Sea16/2/821
st
1215522108E Yinggehai, Pearl River Mouth and S Yellow See22/11/842nd
221732Pearl River Mouth3/1/893rd
181572072.8E China Sea30/6/924th
Sources: China Oil, Nos.3-4, 1988, p.4
Sources: China Economic News, No. 25, 1992, p. 15; No. 11, 1993, p.15; No. 43, 1993, p.16; No.1, 1994, p.16 
Table 2. 1st to 4th Round of Bids
gas bearing structures were discovered during 1984 to 1988 and 1994 to 1998 than 1989 to 1993. The
technological level of the Chinese geophysical prospecting teams improved in the 1980s, reaching world
standards in the 1990s; hence the success rate of oil exploration rose from 36% in 1987 to 73% in 1997,
denoting that Chinese ability to find oil had improved during that period (Su, 1995).
The third round of international bidding was launched in Jan 1989, opening up 32,000 sq km at the
Pearl River Mouth for exploration, but resulted in only 2 contracts signed with 2 companies. The fourth
round, opening up 72,800 sq km at the East China Sea for exploration, was mounted in June 1992,
which elicited a much more enthusiastic response from the foreign firms than in the third round because
the East China Sea was opened up for the first time (Table 4). This round resulted in 18 contracts being
signed with 15 companies coming from 7 countries. That more oil was discovered during 1984-88 and
1994-1998 than 1989-1993 was closely related to the exploration work done by the international oil
firms after the first, second and fourth round of bids.
During 1987-1997, CNOOC invested U.S.$4.04 billion in offshore oil, averaging U.S. $370 million
per year. Total foreign investment was U.S.$3.7 billion, 1.5 billion for exploration and 2.2 billion for
development. An annual average of U.S.$200-300 million was invested by the foreign firms, with
U.S.$100 million each for exploration and development (China Business Review July/Aug., 1994, pp.
10-15). From 1982 to 1998, CNOOC has used U.S.$6.00 billion of foreign funds (Table 5). It is obvious
that China is dependent upon foreign investment to fund its offshore program; should the inflow of for-
eign investments be trimmed, it would adversely affect the industry.
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Cumulative 
Reserves 
Discovered
New Additions 
to Reserve
Oil/Gas 
Structures 
Discovered
Exploratory Wells DrilledSeismic LinesYear 
(Million tonnes)TotalJoint 
Venture
SelfTotalJoint 
Venture
Self
(' 000 km )
1235332403641984
6402812252051985
8342595126251986
8362115275221987
800/9422121282261988
850507291316227151989
//519910249151990
870/421912172151991
1 1002304279184119221992
1 200100719613437361993
1 2101010243214013271994
1 2504053822167540351995
1 4602101048840164112521996
1 64017713371522202121811997
1 8271876371720406//1998
Sources: Almanac of China’s Economy, 1982-1999, various pages
Sources: China Development Report, 1997-1998, various pages
Sources: Encyclopedia Yearbook, 1989-1995, various pages
Table 3. Seismic Survey Lines, Wells Drilled, Oil Discovered
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Cumulative No. of Contracts and AgreementsNo. of Contracts
and AgreementsYear
Contracts/AgreementsCompanyCountry
44241980
44201981
56311982
23319181983
2331901984
28391251985
34581261986
39451251987
44451251988
53451291989
59451261990
66491371991
72501361992
925515201993
100591681994
109621691995
1266718171996
131671851997
137681861998
Sources: Almanac of China’s Economy, 1982-1999, various pages
Table 4. Number of Contracts and Agreements
Cumulative Foreign Investments (U. S. $ Million)Annual Foreign Investments (U.S. $ Million)Year
TotalProductionExplorationTotalProductionExploration
1 390901 3006201304901984
1 7501501 600360603001985
2 0202101 810270602101986
2 2302701 960210601501987
2 4403302 110210601501988
2 7104502 2602701201501989
2 9706002 3702601501101990
3 1206702 45015070801991
3 3608202 540240150901992
3 7001 1002 600340280601993
4 5101 7702 7408106701401994
5 1302 1402 9906203702501995
5 3802 2803 1002501401101996
5 7202 4103 3103401302101997
6 000//280//1998
Sources: Almanac of China’s Economy, 1982-1999, various pages
Sources: China Development Report, 1997-1998, various pages
Table 5. Foreign Investments
Offshore Production
During 1982-1997, total oil-in-place discovered offshore amounted to 1.64 billion tonnes, with Bohai
accounting for 0.97 billion, Pearl River Mouth 0.56 billion and Beibuwan 0.11 billion. Of the total, 0.84
billion tonnes were discovered during 1988-1997.
During 1982-1997, 21 oil/gas fields came on stream (Table 6), 9 in Bohai and 12 in the South China
Sea, including Beibuwan and Yinggehai (Fig. 2). Of the 9 fields in Bohai, 5 are entirely Chinese pro-
jects and 4 being joint ventures. The 12 fields in the South China Sea consist of only 1 entirely Chinese
project, the rest being joint ventures.
Offshore oil production was insignificant in the 1980s, less than 1 million tonnes per year (Table 7),
which is quite easy to understand in light of the long lead time needed for offshore development.
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Maximum
Production
Proven
Reserve
Oil - in 
-place
On Stream
Date
Starting
Date
Foreign Partner or 
SelfOil/Gas FieldOffshore District
(' 000 tonnes/yr.)(Million tonnes)
400/2519851982Japan-China Oil Corp.ChengbeiBohai
300/36.78Aug. 19861983TotalWei 10-3Beibuwan
430//May 1989Feb. 1985Japan-China Oil Corp.Bozhong 28-1Bohai
480//June 19901988Japan-China Corp.Huizhong 34-
2/4Bohai
1 00020/Sept. 1990Oct. 1987ACTHuizhou 21-1Pearl River Mouth
1 500/45Nov. 19911989ACTHuizhou 26-1Pearl River Mouth
10013/Aug. 19921989SelfJinzhou 20-2Bohai
1 000140300Sept. 19931988SelfSuizhongBohai
1 100//Oct. 1993Sept. 1990New S. China Oil Corp. of JapanLufeng 13-1Pearl River Mouth
8001424.50Oct. 19931988SelfWei 11-4Beibuwan
1 500/29.09Nov. 1994June 1998Phillips- PinkertonXijiang 24-3Pearl River Mouth
60020/19951993ACTHuizhou 32-2Pearl River Mouth
60020/19951993ACTHuizhou 32-3Pearl River Mouth
1 100/3019951993Phillips-PinkertonXijiang 30-2Pearl River Mouth
1 000/100March 19951993Japan Oil Corp.ChengdaoBohai 
20019May 1995Dec. 1993SelfCaofeidianBohai
2 92015.06200March 19961993AmocoLiuhua 11-1Pearl River Mouth
3.4 b.cu.m./107.7b.cu.mJan.1996June 1989AmocoYa 13-1*Yinggehai
530/20Nov. 19971992SelfQikou 18-1Bohai
500/20Dec. 19971994SelfQikou 17-3Bohai
1 500//Dec. 19971994OccidentalLufeng 22-1Pearl River Mouth
* Gas field
Sources: Almanac of China's Economy, 1988-1998, various pages
Sources: Studies on Chinese Communism, No. 10, Vol 29, pp. 57-64
Table 6. Oil/Gas Fields Developed During 1985-1997
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Average World
Oil Prices 
(U. S.$/b)
Offshoreas % of
Total Production
 (%)
Onshore
Production
(' 000 tonnes)
Offshore Production
(' 000 tonnes)Year
West S
China Sea
East S
China SeaBohaiTotal
18.150.53133 42635203627141987
14.720.55136 298284604087521988
17.840.66136 747201786249031989
22.970.91137 0502601408601 2601990
19.331.71138 5803001 1709402 4101991
19.032.72138 1702802 5801 0103 8701992
16.823.19140 6105702 9401 1204 6301993
15.904.73139 1771 1113 7271 6386 4761994
17.165.61141 6249495 5621 9048 4151995
20.429.54142 3201 15011 7322 12615 0081996
19.2710.15144 1431 22212 9562 10916 2871997
13.0713.17107 3801 06812 5522 65416 2741998
Sources: Offshore Production and Onshore Production: Almanac of China's Economy, 1982-1999, various pages
Sources: China Development Report 1997-1998, various pages
Sources: Encyclopedia Yearbook, 1989-1995, various pages
Sources: World Oil Prices: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1999
Table 7. Offshore Production, On Shore Production and World Oil Prices,1987-1997
Fig 2. Selected Offshore Oil/Gas Fields in China
Production rose rapidly in the 1990s, surpassing the million tonne mark in 1990 (1.26 million tonnes),
and reached 16.274 million tonnes in 1998, when it accounted for 13.17% of national oil output. This
was made possible by the coming on stream of a number of important fields in the 1990s (Table 6),
including Huizhou 21-1 at Pearl River Mouth with a maximum annual production of 1.00 million tonnes
(on stream year: 1990), Huizhou 26-1 at the same area with a maximum annual production of 1.50 mil-
lion tonnes (1991), Suizhong 36-1 at Bohai with a maximum annual production of 1.00 million tonnes
(1993), Lufeng 13-1 at Pearl River Mouth with a maximum annual production of 1.10 million tonnes
(1993), Xijiang 24-3 at Pearl River Mouth with a maximum annual production of 1.50 million tonnes
(1994), Xijiang 30-2 at the same area with a maximum annual production of 1.10 million tonnes (1995),
Chengdao oil field at Bohai with a maximum annual production of 1.00 million tonnes (1995), Liuhua
11-1 at Pearl River Mouth with a maximum annual production of 2.92 million tonnes (1996) and Lufeng
22-1 at Pearl River Mouth with a maximum annual production of 1.50 million tonnes (1997). These are
the nine offshore fields with annual production of 1 million tonnes or more, which in itself is by no
means regarded as a large field, showing that the Chinese offshore fields are all relatively small.
Additionally, there are only four fields with oil-in-place larger than 100 million tonnes: Suizhong 36-
1 : 300 million tonnes; Liuhua 11-1 : 200 million tonnes; Qinghuangdao 32-6: 170 million tonnes and
Nanbao 35-2: 110 million tonnes. Hence it can be concluded that up to the present few large offshore
fields have been discovered, and most of the producing fields are relatively small.
CNOOC established different companies to take care of the management and development of the off-
shore basins, including the Bohai Oil Co., the South Yellow Sea Oil Co., the East China Sea Oil Co., the
eastern South China Sea Oil Co. and the western South China Sea Oil Co.. Among these companies, the
eastern South China Sea Oil Co., being responsible for the Pearl River Mouth area, had the lion's share
of Chinese offshore production since 1991. By 1998, with a production of 12.552 million tonnes out of a
total of 16.274 million tonnes, the Pearl River Mouth area accounted for 77% of total offshore output.
The Bohai basin, producing 2.654 million tonnes, contributed 16%, whereas the western South China
Sea Co., in control of Beibuwan and Yinggehai, produced 1.068 million tonnes, making up the rest. In
short, present offshore production is dominated by the South China Sea fields.
Factors Contributing to Modest Offshore Production
It is clear that actual offshore production in the 1990s fell far short of the high expectations enter-
tained by many people in the early 1980s. What factors contributed to the deflation of such high hopes?
I. Complex Geological Structure
The first factor is the complex geological structure of the offshore fields. Faulting affected many of
the oil-and-gas bearing structures, exacerbating the situation and leading to the formation of small blocs
of oil-and-gas bearing areas. This is an extension of the complex geological structure of the onshore
fields into the offshore regions. Oil fields found in such areas are usually small and have a short life
span. Because much of the oil is trapped in small pockets, it is argued that a considerable proportion of
it might never be tapped.
Two examples could be cited to illustrate the point: In a joint venture with Japan in Bohai, which has
a very complex geological structure, the Chinese discovered the Bozhung 28-1-1 field, which has very
good prospects. Then several hundred metres away, they drilled the 28-1-4 and 28-1-6 wells, but both
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were dry holes. In another instance, the Chinese drilled on the top of an old buried hill in the South
China Sea, but found no oil. Then they drilled on the saddle, still no oil was discovered. Finally they
drilled on the foothill and discovered a high yielding well. This pattern of discovery contradicts the rule
governing the movement of oil in the oil-and-gas bearing structure: One would expect to find oil at the
top of the hill, not the foothill. Oil is found in the unexpected places, but not found in the areas deemed
to have good prospects. Obviously, this will hamper exploration and development (Liu, X and Liu, H.,
1991; Burns, 1984, 1985).
II. Quality of Chinese Crude
A second factor impeding oil production is the quality of Chinese offshore crude, which is often
heavy (specific gravity greater than 0.92), viscous, with low asphalt content (generally less than 10% of
crude) and low sulphur content (less than 0.8%) (Liu, W, 1988). Given its high viscosity, it is inappro-
priate to use the water injection method of production, instead, steam could be used, which raises the
cost of production. Further, to keep the crude above its pour point to facilitate transportation, heat has to
be added to it, which again boosts production costs. To make matters worse, the content of dissolved gas
is low in the heavy Chinese crude, less than 10 cu.m. of gas per cu.m. of oil. Since the dissolved gas
serves the purpose of driving the oil, low gas content leads to slow oil movement and low production.
The Suizhong 36-1 field in Bohai is an example par excellence of a difficult field to exploit. The vis-
cous oil covers a large area buried in shallow layers, hence the oil field pressure is small, making it
exceedingly difficult to tap. In fact, this field is deemed to be a challenge for offshore exploitation in the
21st Century (She, 1995, p.15).
III. Low World Oil Prices
When China launched its first round of international bidding in 1982, oil was selling at an average
price of U.S.$32.45/b in the world market (Table 7). As the Chinese offshore program unfolded in the
ensuing years, oil prices dropped unceasingly, briefly dipping to U.S.$10/b in 1986, and recovered
somewhat in the subsequent years. Yet, on average, oil prices have never achieved the heights reached
in the early 1980s again.
The precipitous drop in oil prices had grave impacts on Chinese offshore development. After the first
and second round of biddings, the foreign oil companies carried out their drilling work as stipulated in
their contracts. By 1986, quite a few of the firms were disillusioned by the lack of discoveries in their
blocs, especially the lack of large fields. The finds were mostly dry holes or small to medium fields. In
the wake of the collapse in world oil prices, the foreign firms had even less incentive to invest in the
Chinese offshore program. In fact, some of the firms, like Elf-Aquitaine, withdrew completely after they
have completed their contractual commitments (Zhongguo Shiyou, spring 1984, p. 70). Oil majors like
Amoco and Mobil also retreated or trimmed their operations drastically. This partly stemmed from the
cuts in their overall exploration budgets worldwide. The deleterious effect on the Chinese program is
reflected by the drastic drop in contracts signed in the second and third round of biddings compared with
the first round : 12 and 2 respectively versus 19.
After 1986, foreign interests in the offshore program receded drastically : The amount of risk capital
invested shrank from U.S.$490 million in 1984 to U.S.$60 million in 1993. Length of seismic survey
lines carried out dwindled from 36,000 km in 1984 to 2,000 km in 1991. 33 well were drilled in 1984,
but only 3 in 1994.
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Fully aware of the changed situation, China made a number of concessions to retain foreign interests.
First, the foreign firms were allowed a longer period to complete their exploration contractual obliga-
tions. Initially, blocs covering 2,000 sq km or less were given 5 years for the work, and those larger than
that, 7 years. After the oil price collapse, the period was lengthened. Secondly, in cases in which the
exploration results were disappointing, the company could move on to explore another area not yet cov-
ered by another company.
Thirdly, in high risk areas like the deep water zone, the foreign firm is allowed to carry out geophysi-
cal prospecting first, then decide whether to proceed or not, depending on the result of the prospecting
work, in order to ensure a higher success rate of oil discovery (Hui, 1993, pp. 67-68). Fourthly, fields
producing less than 1 million tonnes per year were exempted from the royalty tax, in an attempt to
encourage the exploitation of small fields. The profits tax was reduced from 50% to 33%. All materials
imported were duty free. Losses incurred in the exploration of one bloc could be recovered from another
bloc. All these economic incentives were given in order to entice foreign participation.
Despite the drop in oil prices, China continued to put efforts in offshore development. Drilling 20-30
wells per year entails an investment of 500 million renminbi. As stated above, China is dependent upon
foreign investments to spur its offshore program. Any curtailment of investment inflows will retard the
program.
IV. Physical Environment of Chinese Waters
Environmental factors of the Chinese waters hinder oil development, including frozen seas in the
north, typhoons and high waves in the East and South China Sea, depth of the seas, earthquakes and soft
silts underlying the sea-floor.
The Bohai and Yellow Sea are occasionally affected by freezing in the winter, which often occurs
during the middle of November to mid-March the following year. The seas could be frozen for 90-110
days in one stretch, with the frozen surface extending for 30-40 cm from the top (Wen Wei Pao, 10th
March, 1998). Naturally, this impedes oil exploration and development.
The East and South China Sea are open seas located in the typhoon belt of East Asia. Consequently,
they are affected by the typhoon : On average, the East China Sea is visited by 20 typhoons per year.
Moreover, the eastern portion of the East China Sea and the deep parts of the South China Sea are also
plagued by high waves, with 30% of the waves taller than 8 ft. These adverse environmental factors
undoubtedly impede the offshore program. To cite one well known tragedy, it could be noted that the
drilling ship "Java Sea", while drilling in the Ledong 30-1-1 well area in the South China Sea, was sunk
by typhoon number 8316 in Oct 1983, leading to the death of 81 crew members (Ruan, 1984).
Relatedly, the Liuhua 11-1 field in the Pearl River Mouth area was handicapped by the frequent visits of
typhoons and deep waters, which rendered its exploitation difficult and deferred its coming -on-stream
date. 
The depth of the seas could also be a problem. The Bohai, with an average depth of 18 m, and the
Yellow sea, having an average depth of 44 m on the continental shelf, present little problems. But the
East China Sea ---average depth 1,500 m --- and the South China Sea, with most waters deeper than
4,000 m, are faced with considerable difficulties. It is much more expensive to tap oil in the deep waters
than shallow waters. In fact, the eastern portion of the East China Sea, the Pearl River Mouth Area and
the eastern part of the South China Sea all belong to the third - level technological zone area (Williams,
1975), which signifies that these seas are difficult and expensive to exploit because of their depth (He,
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1984). In fact, given the depth of the South China Sea, it is contended that its oil prospects are not as
good as the East China Sea.
In view of the higher cost in tapping the deeper waters, it can be noted that in 180-200 m deep seas ---
by no means considered as deep seas in offshore development --- only fields with 100 million tonnes
oil-in-place and wells producing at least 300 tonnes/day for 5-8 years could be economically exploited.
But most of the Chinese finds are medium to small fields, hence they are not commercially viable to be
tapped.
Most of the Chinese offshore seas are within the West Pacific active earthquake zone. The Bohai is
especially vulnerable to earthquakes. The Tangshan earthquake in 1976 damaged the oil exploration
work going on then (Cao, 1989, p. 70).
Lastly, the major Chinese rivers like the Yellow River, the Yangtze and the Huai carry a large amount
of silt into the eastern seas every year. The shallow coastal seas are underlain by a layer of soft silt, usu-
ally 2-7 m thick. This retards oil exploration in the sense that the soft silt could lead to the slipping of
the submersible drilling ships.
V. Conflicts Over Sovereignty
In the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty, each coastal state is entitled to claim 12 nautical miles of ter-
ritorial sea, 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone and the resources lying in the seabed of the
continental shelf adjoining the state. Hence, conflicting claims over the sovereignty of certain offshore
oil resources are unavoidable (Glassner, 1996, pp. 515-544).
China laid claim to wide stretches of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Its
claim includes Taiwan, the Diaoyus, the Pescadores, the Pratas, the Macclesfield Bank, the Paracels, and
the Spratly Islands (Fig. 3). Apart from historical reasons, the Chinese argued that the Yellow Sea, the
East China Sea and the South China Sea are underlain by deposition coming from the major Chinese
rivers like the Yellow River, the Yangtze and the Pearl River (Qin, 1995; Liao, 1996, p. 80).
In the Yellow and the East China Sea, China has overlapping claims with S. Korea, Japan and Taiwan
over certain parts of the seas. In 1972, S. Korea tried to develop the offshore resources of the Yellow
Sea by co-operating with Gulf Oil in an area also claimed by China. The operation ceased after Chinese
objection. Also in the 1970s, Taiwan laid claims to wide stretches of the East China Sea and signed con-
tracts with U.S. oil firms to explore the East China Sea basin by carrying out geophysical prospecting. In
the 1980s, S. Korea and Japan agreed to co-operate in the exploration for oil in the seas adjacent to the
two countries: They explored in the northern rim of the East China Sea basin. China objected, and
drilled the Longjing No.1 well in a location south of the Korea-Japan exploration site. Thereafter, explo-
ration activities by all parties in the area ceased.
Conflicts over sovereignty in the South China Sea are especially acute. In 1968, the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East reported the discovery of a long narrow ridge on the continental
shelf of the South China Sea, pointing to the possibility of rich oil reserves. Some estimates put the
reserves at 20 billion tonnes, surpassing that of Kuwait which has the third largest reserves in the world
(Chen, Q, 1992). Since none of the islands or reefs is more than 200 nautical miles from land, hence
overlapping claims over the islands are bound to occur, which is easily understandable in light of the
fact that a state owning an island could claim a territorial sea and exclusive economic zone around it.
In 1977, Vietnam declared a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, and
claimed historic sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and Paracels. Now, Vietnam occupies 30 islands in
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the Spratly Islands, including Wanan Tan, Xiwei Tan and the Nanhua Reef. In 1978, the Philippines
included almost all islands of the Spratly and 240,000 sq km of the adjacent seas into the Palawan
District, claiming sovereignty over it. At present, the country occupies 8 islands in the Spratlys, includ-
ing Zhongye and Mahuan (Liao, 1996, pp. 83-84). Practically all of the islands and semi-submerged
reefs have been occupied by the adjacent states, and the latter have all enacted mining acts and drawn up
blocs to attract foreign participation in oil development.
The case of Vietnam is worth recounting. In 1988, the country drew up 185 blocs, covering almost all
of the southern portion of the South China Sea, and invited bids from the international oil firms.
Contracts were signed with companies from the U.S., Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Canada, the U.K. etc. 60
wells were drilled (Zheng, 1996, p. 201). In the late 1980s, the country discovered the Daxiong oil-field
in the Wanan Basin, which produced 3,400 tonnes/day. From 1985-92, its offshore oil production grew
from zero to 5.4 million tonnes per year, when it overtook rice to become the leading export commodity
of the country.
In 1996, Indonesia signed a U.S.$3.5 billion contract with Exxon to look for hydrocarbons in the
South China Sea, intruding into the seas surrounding the Spratly Islands. It would seem that China had
not objected to the project, probably because the area explored rightly fell under Indonesian sovereignty. 
China has had a number of conflicts with Vietnam and the Philippines in relation to the South China
Sea. In 1974, China got into a military conflict with Vietnam and established its control and sovereignty
over the Paracels. In 1988, China again clashed militarily with Vietnam over the Chigua Reef in the
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Fig 3. Islands in the South China Sea
Spratly Islands. In April 1994, CNOOC co-operated with an international oil firm to look for oil in
Wanan Bei in the Spratlys, with the Chinese navy providing protection to the exploration team. Vietnam
retaliated by carrying out geophysical prospecting in Wanan Tan to disrupt the Chinese effort (Qin,
1995).
The conflict was only temporarily resolved after President Jiang Zi-min visited Vietnam in Nov 1994.
Future of Offshore Production
Chinese offshore production has fallen short of expectations. Output is estimated to be maintained at
about 20 million tonnes per year in the next few years. By 2005, production could rise to 30 million
tonnes, with 10 million tonnes coming from Bohai and the rest from the South China Sea fields. By
2000, offshore oil is slated to account for 13% of total oil output, rising to 19% by 2010 (State Statistical
Bureau, 1997, p. 96; Zhang, G., 1993). Given that oil consumption exceeded domestic production by 29
million tonnes in 1998, which could widen to 100 million tonnes by 2010, it is clear that offshore pro-
duction cannot materially alter the oil balance of the country. In recent years, it has helped to arrest the
decline in total production, offsetting the dip in onshore output. In the future, it could play the same role,
yet it would be difficult to boost total production substantially by jacking up offshore production.
The economics of offshore production up to the present has not been encouraging : During 1990 to
1997, total sales of offshore oil amounted to 55 billion renminbi, and CNOOC has been given the right
to market offshore oil according to international prices (Table 8). Up to 1997, China and the internation-
al oil firms had invested a total of U.S.$9.2 billion (76 billion renminbi) in the offshore program, which
exceeds the sales receipts mentioned above. As a result, CNOOC carried debts to the amount of
U.S.$1.4 billion and 4.0 billion renminbi in 1995 (State Statistical Bureau, 1996, 1997, 1998; Hui, 1989,
pp. 129-130). Of course, the economic situation could improve substantially in the future when the
existing fields continue to produce year after year, and the initial investments got amortized. During
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Sales Receipts
(Billion Renminbi)ExportsDomesticTotal SalesYear
CumulativeAnnual(%)(' 000 tonnes)
//33.866.27051988
//70.329.79341989
1.4030.84//1 1621990
4.1432.7431.868.22 3901991
7.2533.1124.675.43 9231992
10.7833.5322.078.04 4401993
17.3336.5519.880.26 4721994
26.2138.8816.483.68 1501995
40.18313.9735.964.115 1401996
55.0831.4936.064.016 0401997
//29.270.816 0001998
Sources: Almanac of China’s Economy, 1988-1999, various pages
Sources: China Development Report 1997-1998, various pages
Sources: Encyclopedia Yearbook, 1989-1995, various pages
Table 8. Sales of Offshore Oil, 1988-1997
1988 to 1998, on average 65-80% of offshore oil was sold domestically, with 15-30% being exported
each year. Part of the oil was exported because under the production sharing arrangement, the foreign
partner is paid for by means of the oil produced (Chen, F., 1989, p. 47).
To be impartial in assessing future offshore prospects, it should be noted that the degree of explo-
ration carried out so far is relatively low ; with more extensive exploration in the future, it is highly like-
ly that more hydrocarbons will be found. It was reported that in the U.K. portion of the North Sea, dur-
ing 1967-71, 43 exploratory wells were drilled, with 8 discovering oil/gas, giving a success rate of
18.6%. In the basin deemed with the best prospects, 234 wells were sunk, with 85 finding oil/gas, giving
a success rate of 36.3%. In the Pearl River Mouth area of the South China Sea, during 1983-96, 47 geo-
logical structures were explored, with 9 discovering oil, yielding a success rate of 19.1%. In the Huizhou
Basin of the Pearl River Mouth area, 6 out of 11 exploratory wells yielded oil, giving a success rate of
55%. These figures seemed to support the contention that the prospects for finding oil in the Chinese
offshore seas are no worse than in the U.K. North Sea. In fact, the total area of the 6 Chinese offshore
seas is 3 times as large as the U.K. North Sea, yet the number of wells drilled is only one-seventh of that
of the latter. Confining the discussion to China, it could be noted that the density of exploratory wells
drilled onshore is 10 times that of offshore, which attests to the low degree of offshore exploration so
far.
Consequently, the Chinese pointed out that it is too early to conclude categorically what the real
prospects of offshore production are. Large fields with oil-in-place exceeding 100 million tonnes like
Suizhong and Liuhua have been discovered; hence the contention that no or few large fields will be
found in the Chinese offshore areas might be refuted in the future. 
Up to the present, the Chinese strategy is to develop the more favourable offshore areas first, thereby
concentrating their efforts in the Bohai and the Pearl River Mouth area. Only in relatively recent years
have they started to explore in the Yellow sea and the East China Sea. In the latter area, a number of sig-
nificant discoveries was made in the Pinghu and Pingbei development zone (Hui, 1995). The Pinghu oil-
field was scheduled for completion in 1998. In the Yellow sea, only two wells saw oil/gas, and no com-
mercial discoveries were made so far. Naturally, in the wake of more exploration, new oil/gas resources
will be discovered in the offshore seas. The East China Sea, with a depth smaller than the South China
Sea, holds especially promising prospects.
Offshore production could be boosted if conflicts over sovereignty are resolved. This will allow the
opening up of vast stretches of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea for explo-
ration. In 1992, in the ASEAN meeting in Manila, the ASEAN Declaration adopted the principle of joint
development of the resources in the Spratly Islands, and to resolve the issue of sovereignty by peaceful
dialogue among the states concerned. Yet, in view of the conflict between China and the Philippines
over the structures on the Mischief Reef, it is difficult to see how the overlapping claims issue could be
resolved in the foreseeable future. The row between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the
Diaoyus islands does not bode well for the resolution of conflicts in the East China Sea either.
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